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Abstract— Cognitive radio networks (CRNs) are found to 
be, without difficulty wide-open to external malicious 
threats. Secure communication is an important prerequisite 
for forthcoming fifth-generation (5G) systems, and CRs are 
not exempt. A framework for developing the accomplishable 
benefits of physical layer security (PLS) in an amplify-and-
forward cooperative spectrum sensing (AF-CSS) in a 
cognitive radio network (CRN) using a stochastic geometry 
is proposed. In the CRN the spectrum sensing data from 
secondary users (SU) are collected by a fusion center (FC) 
with the assistance of access points (AP) as cognitive relays, 
and when malicious eavesdropping SU are listening. In this 
paper we focus on the secure transmission of active APs 
relaying their spectrum sensing data to the FC. Closed 
expressions for the average secrecy rate are presented. 
Analytical formulations and results substantiate our 
analysis and demonstrate that multiple antennas at the 
APs is capable of improving the security of an AF-CSS-
CRN. The obtained numerical results also show that 
increasing the number of FCs, leads to an increase in the 
secrecy rate between the AP and its correlated FC.  
Index Terms— Communication system security; 
physical layer security; cognitive radio networks; Amplify-
and-Forward;  
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the broadcast nature of transmission techniques 
wireless communication links allow for a malicious 
eavesdropper to hijack. In reality, communication 
security in wireless networks is becoming ever more 
critical. As a means of solving the problem, traditional 
cryptographic methods are set out on the higher layers 
of network protocols. Traditional security techniques are 
not essentially effective against potential attacks from 
the open wireless environment any longer. These 
traditional cryptographic techniques are likewise 
becoming costly. Equally a substitute, physical layer 
security, exploiting distinctive features from the lower 
layer, has become a new research focus for several 
wireless communication networks.  
A. Related Work
The fundamental research on physical layer secure
communication was researched in depth by [1]. A 
wiretap channel model, with the secrecy rate defined as 
the rate at which information can be transmitted secretly 
from a source to its proposed destination, was 
considered in [2, 3]. Especially, it is conceivable to  
achieve a non-zero secrecy rate without distribution of a 
key, where the malicious eavesdropper is restricted to 
learn virtually nil from the transmissions. In [4] an 
addition of this research led to the case of the broadcast 
channel with confidential information being proposed. 
The average secure communication rates as well as the 
outage probability with an eavesdrop-per listening to the 
transmission over an additional independent fading 
channel were researched by [5]. Where the ergodic 
secrecy capacity region for a fading broadcast channel 
with confidential messages was explored in [6]. The 
secrecy capacity of a block-ergodic fading channel was 
presented in [7]. Numerous approaches for a relay node 
to improve the secrecy of a wiretap channel were 
explored in [8-10]. A technique of employing channel 
diversity to improve the secrecy capacity in wireless 
communication is presented in [11]. 
Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs) are becoming one 
of the most promising technologies that aim for efficient 
spectrum utilization and alleviating the spectrum 
scarcity problem caused by the demand for wireless 
bandwidth growing rapidly due to the increase in growth 
of various mobile and IoT  application [12-14]. CRNs 
are found to be without difficulty wide-open to external 
malicious threats. Secure communication is an important 
prerequisite for forthcoming fifth-generation (5G) 
systems, and CRNs are not exempt. Especially, security 
of CRN is perilous [15-19]. The proposal of reliable 
weighted relays and distribution of transmission power 
with diverse relaying protocols, for instance amplify-and-
forward (AF), decode-and-forward (DF), in addition to 
cooperative jamming were presented in [20]. Relay 
preference was proposed for secure CRN with a sole 
eavesdropper was suggested in [21]. To exploit the 
security feature of CRNs, Game theory was employed in 
[17]. An overview of research outcomes in information-
theoretic security by means of multiple wireless 
transmitters which focuses on distilling insights for 
designing wireless systems with secrecy was presented in 
[22]. 
The ability to sense the presence of a primary users 
(PU) is of the utmost importance of CRNs. Nevertheless, 
this mechanism introduces susceptibilities that may 
permit an attacker to disguise as a PU that occupies a 
licensed share of the spectrum and cause a denial-of-
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service (DoS) attack for SUs. This method of attack is 
known as primary user emulation (PUE) attack [23]. To 
address the limits of key-based security, physical layer 
security is now emerging as a promising paradigm to 
address the security problem in CRN by exploiting the 
physical characteristics of wireless channels to achieve 
perfect secrecy against eavesdropping [24].     A selection 
combing (SC) employing a preeminent SNR in the 
receiver of the destination and the eavesdropper is 
proposed in [25]. It is undoubtedly not the ideal solution 
because the unfilled diversity paths are underutilized. It 
provides the inspiration in this paper to use maximal-ratio 
combining for increased security. In this paper, a channel 
diversity with maximal-ratio combining is proposed to 
increase the secrecy capacity as in comparison to the SC 
scheme proposed in [25], by taking advantage of the 
physical characteristics in the wireless channels to 
achieve ideal secrecy against eavesdroppers [24, 26].      
B. Method and Contributions 
The potential benefits of physical layer security in an 
amplify-and-forward cooperative spectrum sensing (AF-
CSS) in a cognitive radio network (CRN) using a 
stochastic geometry are proposed in this paper. In an AF-
CSS-CRN, the SUs are positioned remote from the FC, 
and the access points (AP) are positioned to support the 
SUs transmit individual sensing data to the FC. This 
private data transmission can be hijacked by malicious 
eavesdroppers. Assuming that SUs are heavily deployed 
and their positions are randomly distributed, a stochastic 
geometry, namely a homogeneous Poisson point process 
is used to model the positions of the CRs in the CRN. 
The spectrum sensing and amplification technique used 
in this work can be found in the author’s previous work 
in [27]. The main contributions of this paper are listed 
as follows: 
1. An analytical framework to analyze the 
implementation of physical layer security in AF-
CSS-CRN is developed.  
2. The positions and spatial densities of SUs, APs, FCs, 
and eavesdroppers are modeled by means of 
stochastic geometry. Individually APs are furnished 
with MIMO antennas and make use of the low 
complexity maximal-ratio-combining to receive the 
sensing data from the SUs and maximal-ratio-
transmission beamformer to transmit the signals. 
3. Statistical properties are presented, centered on 
which new closed formulation relating to the average 
secrecy rate between the distinctive AP and its 
correlated FC are derived*1.  
4. A novel compact expression for the average secrecy 
rate between the AP and the FC is derived. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section II presents 
the system model. Section III presents the average 
1 The average secrecy rate between the distinctive SU and its 
correlated AP are derived in in the author’s previous work in [29].  
secrecy rate between the APs and FCs. Section IV 
presents the numerical results corroborating with 
detailed analysis and finally Section V provides 
concluding remarks. 
II. SYSTEM MODEL 
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Fig. 1.  An AF-CSS-CRN: the SUs transmit sensing data to the 
FCs through the APs, when eavesdroppers are present. 
 
The CRN system model is presented in Fig. 1, the SUs 
transmit sensing data to the fusion centre (FC) by means 
of a half duplex amplify-and-forward (AF) access points 
(APs) without straight links amongst SUs and FCs. The 
eavesdroppers listen into both sensing data 
transmissions devoid of altering the data. SUs are 
unsystematically positioned in the spectrum sensing 
field based on a homogeneous Poisson point process 
(HPPP) 
cr  with intensity cr . To envisage inadvertent 
deployment of APs and FCs the random positions of the 
APs and FCs are approximated as a complete random 
HPPPs 
ap and fc  with intensities ap and fc , 
respectively, that is appropriate in wide scale systems 
[28]. The SUs transmit spectrum sensing data 
sporadically. Therefore, the probability that a SU is 
prompted into transmitting the sensing data is 
represented as ,  0 1cr cr   , and the probability that 
an AP is activated to amplifies and forwards the sensing 
data to the FC is represented as ,  0 1cr cr   . The 
probability of being an active SU or AP is assumed to 
be completely random of the SU or AP position. Hence 
the active SU or AP is made up of complete random 
HPPPs 
,cr a and ,ap a  with intensities cr cr  and 
ap ap  , respectively. It is assumed that the 
eavesdroppers are non- collaboration and that 
eavesdroppers’ positions are modelled as completely 
random HPPPs 
,cr e and ,ap e with intensities 
cr
e and
ap
e , respectively. The data transmitted by the SU is 
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hijacked by the eavesdroppers in 
,cr e  and the sensing 
data transmitted through the AP is hijacked by the 
eavesdroppers in
,ap e . 
 In this CRN model, the SU is correlated with its 
closest AP to receive the SU’s sensing data and the AP 
is correlated through its closest FC to receive the AP’s 
sensing data. Individual AP have M-antennas, and the 
SUs and FCs have a single antenna. The APs use 
maximal-ratio combining to receive the SUs’ sensing 
data signals and maximal-ratio-transmission 
beamformer to transmit the signals to the FC, which 
amplifies the sensing data transmission. The wireless 
channels between the SU and AP and AP and FC are 
modelled as independent Rayleigh quasi-static fading, 
respectively. A distinctive AP receives data from its 
nearest arbitrary distinctive SU O . The distinctive AP 
receives valuable data from the distinctive SU and 
interference originating from other active SU and active 
AP. Consequently, the received signal-to-interference-
plus-noise ratio (SINR) succeeding the maximal-ratio 
combining at its corresponding distinctive AP can be 
presented by 
 
0 0 0 0
2
, ,
2
, ,
,
/
ap
cr ap cr ap
ap
cr ap ap ap cr
In
X
I I P





 
h
  (1)           
where 
0 0
0 0, 0
0 0
2
†
,
, , ,\{ }
,
,
cr a
cr ap
cr ap i ap i api cr
cr ap
I X



h
h
h
 
0 0
0 0, 0
0 0
2
†
,,
, , ,\{ }
, ,
,
j
ap a
j
j fccr ap
ap ap j ap j apj ap
cr ap j fc
I X




 
hh
H
h h
 
and / .ap crP P   Interfering APs conveys their 
individual valuable sensing data to their corresponding 
FCs using maximal-ratio-transmission beamformer 
vector 
†
,
,
j
j
j fc
j fc
h
h
. These are received and combined at the 
distinctive AP with maximal-ratio combining vector 
0 0
0 0
†
,
,
cr ap
cr ap
h
h
, where 
0 0,cr ap
h  is the channel fading vector and 
0 0,cr ap
X is the distance from the distinctive SU to its 
distinctive AP. Where  represents the path-loss 
exponent, 
0
1
,
M
i ap C
h is the channel fading vector from 
the i-th SU to the distinctive  AP and 
0,i ap
X the distance 
from the i-th SU to the distinctive  AP. 
0,j ap
H  is the 
channel fading matrix amongst the interfering j-th AP  
and the distinctive AP, while 
0,j ap
X  is the distance 
amongst the interfering j-th AP  and the distinctive AP. 
1
,   j
M
j fc C
h  is the channel fading vector amongst the 
interfering j-th AP and its equivalent FC, 
2  is the noise 
power, 
crP  is the SU’s transmission power, and apP  is 
the AP’s transmission power. 
 In the non- collaboration eavesdropping situation, the 
greatest damaging eavesdropper that possess the 
uppermost received SINR dictates the secrecy rate [15]. 
A random eavesdropper 
ke that hijacks the SU and the 
AP transmission listen to the valuable sensing data from 
the distinctive SU to the distinctive AP, and 
concurrently acquires the interfering sensing data from 
the additional active SUs and active AP. 
ke is impaired 
by the interfering signals transmitted from additional 
interfering AP using the maximal-ratio-transmission 
beamformer 
†
,
,
k
k
j fc
j fc
h
h
. Hence, the received SINR at the 
most unfavourable eavesdropper in 
,cr e for the SU and 
the AP transmission is known by  
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h and
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X are distinctive SU and the 
ke , correspondingly, 
, ki e
h  is the channel fading coefficient and , ki e
X is the 
distance between the i-th SUs and the eavesdropper. 
, kj e
h  is the channel fading vector and , kj e
X  is the 
distance from the j-th AP to the eavesdropper. 
The distinctive AP 
0ap will forward the sensed data to 
the closet FC 
0fc  for data collection after receiving the 
distinctive SU’s data. Owing to the present transmission 
from additional active AP, the distinctive FC suffers 
from their interferences. Intrinsically, the received SINR 
at the distinctive FC 
0fc is given by 
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0 , oap fc
X
is the distance between the distinctive AP and its 
distinctive FC.  Where β is the path-loss exponent, 
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,
M
j fc C
g and 
0,j fc
X  are the channel fading vector 
and distance between the j-th AP  and the distinctive FC, 
and 
0
1
,
M
j fc C
h is the channel fading vector between 
the j-th AP and its correlated FC. A random 
eavesdropper 
ke which hijacks the distinctive AP and 
the distinctive FC sensing data transmission listens into 
the signal which is transmitted by the distinctive AP 
with the maximal-ratio-transmission beamformer
0 0
0 0
†
,
,
ap fc
ap fc
g
g
, and experience degradation due to the 
interfering signals caused through other interfering APs 
emission with the maximal-ratio-transmission 
beamformer
†
,
,
k
k
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j fc
h
h
.  Consequently, the receive SINR 
possessed at the utmost unfavourable eavesdropper for 
the AP and the FC transmission is given as 
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g and 0 , kap e
X are the channel fading coefficient 
and distance from the distinctive AP to the 
eavesdropper, respectively, and 
, kj e
g is the channel 
fading vector and , kj e
X  is the distance from the j-th 
AP to the eavesdropper, respectively. 
III. SECRECY RATE BETWEEN AP AND FC 
The average secrecy rate that is established on the worst 
case is evaluated. In order to calculate the average 
secrecy rate, the eavesdropper with the best SINR is 
considered [20]. Therefore, in the case of a distinctive 
link between a distinctive AP and its correlated FC, the 
momentary secrecy rate is given by 
 
,[ ]
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2log (1 )fc fcC    is the 
capacity of the channel between the distinctive AP and 
FC, and 
, 2 ,log (1 )ap e ap eC   is the capacity of the 
eavesdropping channel between the distinctive AP and 
the utmost detrimental eavesdropper.  The cumulative 
distribution functions (CDFs) of SINRs at the distinctive 
AP and the most detrimental eavesdropper that hijacks 
the transmission between the distinctive SU and AP are 
derived in the following subsection. 
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Subsequently substituting the derivation from (11) and 
(10) into (6) gives the CDF of fc  as shown in (12). 
B. The CDF of SINR at the most detrimental 
eavesdropper between the APs and FCs 
The CDF of SINR at the utmost unfavourable 
eavesdropper which hijacks the transmitted signal 
between the distinctive AP and the FC is solved by 
taking (4) into consideration, the CDF of ,ap e is derived 
as follows: 
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where, (13.1) and (13.2) are obtained from the HPPP 
and polar coordinates, respectively. From the functional 
HPPP in  [16]  the Laplace transform of ,ap eI  is given as  
,
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Substituting (13) into (14) the CDF of ,ap e is solved as  
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C. Average Secrecy Rate 
The average of secrecy rate fc
crC  over fc  and ,ap e is 
average secrecy rate between the AP and the FC, that is 
given as   
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
  (16) 
Substituting the CDF of fc in (12) and the CDF of ,ap e
in (15) into (16), the average secrecy rate between the 
AP and the FC can be obtained.  
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
TABLE I 
SUMMARY OF PARAMETERS 
Parameters Values 
SUs transmit power  crP  12 dBm  
Power Spectral Density of Noise 0N  160 dBm/Hz  
Channel Gain complex Gaussian distribution  
 with zero mean and unit variance 
       Bandwidth 1.5 MHz 
Number of Antennas M 1 - 4 
 
Numerical examples are presented to show the average 
secrecy rate of the AF-CSS-CRN between the APs and 
FCs. A summary of the parameters used are presented in 
Table 1. In Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, an exact match between the 
simulations and the precise analytical curves are 
presented, which validated the theoretical formulations.  
In Fig. 2 the average secrecy rate between the AP and 
the FC versus /ape ap  for different 
ap
e and M is 
observed, where 0.2,ap   3.0,   
310fc
  and
18 dBm.apP   The numerical results are acquired from 
(16). Firstly, it can be seen that the average secrecy rate 
decreases as /ape ap   increases, which points toward the 
fact that more APs are needed as the intensity of 
eavesdroppers who hijack the transmitted sensing data 
between AP and FC increases, owing to the damaging 
consequences of eavesdropping. Secondly, as the 
number of antennas M at the AP increases, the average 
secrecy rate between the AP and FC increases due to the 
array gain brought about by using maximal-ratio 
combining at the AP. Using the identical number of 
antennas at the AP, the average secrecy rate decreases as 
ap
e  increases. 
 
Fig. 2.  Average secrecy rate versus / apap e  . 
 
Fig. 3.  Average secrecy rate versus ap . 
In Figure 3, the average secrecy rate between the AP 
and the FC versus ap  for different values of fc  and M 
are presented, where . 0.2,ap ap   
310ape
 , 3.0 
, and 20 dBm.apP   The numerical results are acquired 
from (16). Firstly, it can be seen that the average secrecy 
rate changes marginally when 
33 10 ,ap
   and 
decreases as ap  increases when 
33 10ap
  , due to 
the fact that when
33 10 ,ap
   the interference from 
additional active APs is comparatively small in relation 
to the noise, while increasing the number of AP hardly 
has an effect on the system performance. Nevertheless, 
when 
33 10ap
   the interference from the APs has a 
significant effect on the SINR between the AP and the 
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FC. Consequently, an increase in the interference from 
the AP worsens the average secrecy rate. Finally, it can 
be realised that the average secrecy rate between the AP 
and FC increases when the density of the FC increases. 
This is due to the fact that the distance between the 
distinctive AP and the corresponding FC turns out to be 
shorter. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have presented and analyzed the 
physical layer security of an AF-CSS-CRN scheme. The 
impact of random positions and spatial densities of SU, 
AP and FC and external eavesdroppers and number of 
antennas at the AP on the secrecy performance have 
been analyzed. A vital result presented by analytical 
formulations and Monte Carlo simulation is the least 
total of FCs necessary when the average secrecy rate is 
set, that assists secure SU cognitive radio deployment in 
CRNs. The results presented have highlighted the 
importance of secure transmission in a practical and 
applied CRN. 
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